

# **Operation Sentry Stopper: A Long-Standing Espionage**

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# Cyber Threats To Financial Institutions




## ATM Malware on the Rise


- More than 3 million ATMs
- 8.6 billion cash withdrawals per year






#### European ATM attack statistics from 2011 to 2015







#### Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Transfers





# **Incidents Summary**

- Attackers have in-depth knowledge on SWIFT
- Familiar how banks operate the system
- SWIFT codes are hardcoded in the malware
- Parse transaction messages and send fake one



## **Before Financial Loss and Reputational Damage**






# Sentry Stopper

#### **Target Region**







#### Since when?

- Earliest Sample Feb 2009
  - Earliest Compile Time

### Sun Feb 08 17:41:48 2009

• Earliest Timestamp from configuration file

3	SleepHostname=	
1	SleepTo=2007/03/11 12:15	
5	NoSleepIP=*	
5		
7	dtime=2005/7/30 11:45	



#### Since when?

#### 2013媒体报道

"证券幽灵"恶意威胁现身 趋势科技率先预	
金融行业应做出应急	响应 道防成为韩国金融行业APT攻击事件的"翻版"
[趋势科技中国]-[2013年7月30日]近日,趋势科业的APT(Atvanced Persistent Threat,高级担心的APT(Atvanced Persistent Threat,高级担心的APT)	2013媒体报道
科技通过检测BKDR_CORUM家族、TSPY_GO TROJ_GENERIC.APC等恶意病毒,目前将此威	
估内部网络风险,谨防韩国金融行业APT攻击事( CRTL研究表明,"证券幽灵"恶意威胁拥有了更加	请密切关注"证券幽灵"恶意程序
对IT管理人员的终端、域控、DNS服务器、网络: 被篡改后的第三方软件传播释放,但"证券幽灵"); 数字信息和替代者。	请注意"证券幽灵" <del>恶意程序。</del> 最近,趋势科技在中国地区,发现了数起感染"证券幽灵" <del>恶意程序</del> 的事件。该恶意程序以证券行业 为目标,极度顽强和具有隐蔽性,在目标环境中已经潜伏了一段时间。我们相信这由一组专业的黑客,针对证券行业发起的一 系列APT行为。
	相关检测:BKDR_CORUM家族、TSPY_GOSME家族、TROJ_JNCTN家族及China Pattern通用检测TROJ_GENERIC.APC
	概述:
	该 <del>恶意程序主要针对IT人员的PC和域控、DNS服务器、网络安全和管理软件服务器等计算机。根据趋势科技目前发现的信息,</del> 该恶意程序并不会在目标网络中大范围传播,并且具有很长的潜伏期,因此难以发现。该恶意程序以窃取文档、帐号、密码等 重要数据为主要目的,并保持对目标网络的持续监视和控制。但是有证据显示,黑客会保持对目标网络一定数量计算机的控制 权,一旦有计算机被处理,黑客会尝试重新入侵这些计算机或者寻找其他的替代者。



- Frequent Updates
- Pretend to have normal traffic
- Use legitimate Services
- Stop the Sentry



• Frequent Updates

HttpPara=http://	.com/admin/upimages/a flow r2 c3.jpg
HttpV1=http://	.cn/images/L2.jpg
HttpMini=http://	.com/images/wjyb.jpg
Http64=http://	.com/images/wjktg.jpg
HttpEnumDll=http://	.com/images/gigiu.jpg
HttpGnaDll=http://	.com/images/tcyb.jpg




tcyb[1].jpg	1FR0	00006E4B Hiew 8.10 (c)SEN
1	2F-39 D7 B5 ØD-32 FA FE E3-F4	
天气預量	74-DD 36 AØ FA-68 4Ø E4 CD-B9	AC B2 30 $\pm$ Rt 6á h $\Theta\Sigma$ $\pm$ 200
A Obtob	CD-F6 53 97 C3-9D 4F 63 E8-B2 A9-FF 00 7F 9B-F9 F2 FF 00-8E	EØ C2 3C $\Sigma \approx + Su + 0c2$ $\alpha + (-2) \approx + 2c2$ B8 39 F2 $y \times + - 2c^{-2} + 3 + 9^{-2}$
	F4-A5 5C 6D FD-5A 7A ED 4A-57	B8 39 F2 yx  r Δ¢+2 Αη92 95 46 6D ΟΚ <sup>L</sup> [Ñ\m <sup>2</sup> ZzøJWòFm
- C.	FF-D6 82 27 1F-8F AF 5F D9-E5	F8 E7 7C : S_πe' ¥8»_Jσ°τ!
and the second s	9C-85 39 75 FD-9A FF 00 1C-90	48 56 92 +!!F£a9u2U -EHVÆ
раяволев. 14 то Lo		53 FE 2D ö§J₁♥₿ïØç¢ì♠yS∎-
00006DD0: AF 1F C3		DB D5 FE »▼ 6 à f>10½ F
00006DE0: 3B 64 85		39 22 84 ;dàÑJ A1N?G***9"a
00006DF0: 75 A7 A9		64 64 CA uerik(z~in idd"
00006E00: 2A D3 FA 00006E10: 40 B2 41		9A FE CE *********************************
00006E10: 40 B2 41 00006E20: 83 3E A7		9A 60 50 @%A_zö f√kà>ü Ŷ 5F 25 2A â>≏ó~ <sub>F</sub> 9∆æ0óèJ_:×*
00006E30: 29 4E A7		FC 72 B2 )Nºio@pating"r
00006E40: 90 97 EF		
00006E50: 4A E9 BE		B7 54 9F J0±6(X ~)T ( +nTf
00006E60: 41 5D F5		AØ 14 93 AJJ‡!!¥Ç«=0Q@'á¶ô
00006E70: 49 72 96		7E FC 9B Irû♦A¥[[h;wä1@~m¢
00006E80: E0 EC 04		98 31 31 α∞♦ΓΕΑιι >m °ÿ11
00006E90: 56 E6 81		E6 5C 10 Unit of Dok
00006EA0: 15 6A 19 00006EB0: 64 6B 65		D5 3E 88 Sj∔Möòny▼♥└Ô╨ϝ≻ê D2 7C 1B dkea0 . ±Aôniπi∺
00006EC0: 87 09 9A		
00006ED0: B6 C4 B1		
00006EE0: 12 31 E6		BF 94 C2 \$1µ! <sup>u</sup> g <sup>u</sup> []?%rëjör
00006EF0: 1F 62 BA	3D-CF 23 83 13-C8 FØ 83 5F-96	94 68 87 ▼bll=±#â‼⊑â ûöhc
00006F00: E0 E7 96		A3 70 EC arti+fmll+Lu-ffqupo
00006F10: ED E2 99		B7 C7 A2 Øľ0 arl. 👫 🖬 👘 🔞
00006F20: A8 72 A5	4B-46 D3 54 82-78 EC 57 8D-22	2A C6 16 crŇKF <sup>u</sup> TéxœWi'*



• Frequent Updates

Name	Туре	Data
(Default)	REG_SZ	(value not set)
1 📖 ar	REG_BINARY	88 4b 33 bf c5 16 69 67 07 55 a2 be 25 eb 8a c3 43 5b
BootCount	REG_DWORD	0x00000042 (66)
Closetype	REG_SZ	abnormal
FriendlyTypeName	REG_SZ	0
ab)ikey	REG_SZ	SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Wi
Mesg	REG_SZ	
ab MiniTypeName	REG_SZ	rdvrfp.sys







#### • Pretend to have normal traffic

Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: , Dst: 59.41.16.188 (59.41.16.188) version: 4 Header Length: 20 bytes Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP 0x00: Default; ECN: 0x00: Not-ECT (Not ECN-Capable Transport)) Total Length: 772 Identification: 0xa8d0 (43216) Fragment offset: 0 Time to live: 128 Protocol: TCP (6) Header checksum: 0x4b0c [validation disabled] Source: Destination: 59.41.16.188 (59.41.16.188) [Source GeoIP: Unknown] [Destination GeoIP: Unknown] Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 3573 (3573), Dst Port: 80 (80), Seq: 608, Ack: 1, Len: 732
Hypertext Transfer Protocol E GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, appl Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\n Acceptt-Language: en\_US\r\n Host: windowsupdate.microsoft.com\r\n Content-Type: multipart/form-data\r\n User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible: MSIE 6.0: windows NT 5.1: SV1)\r\n Content-Length: 732\r\n Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n Cache-Control: no-cache\r\n Cookie: MC1=GUID=1f4b375b9odgej15fuza45&LV=20077&V=409&HASH=5b37pgm01q55bad; A=I&I=AXUFCVBDJFJFACaBwAARhRE0S1EV75udyf7244si \r\n [Full request URI: http://windowsupdate.microsoft.com/] [HTTP request 1/2] [Response in frame: 1023] The multipart dissector could not find the required boundary parameter.

• Use legitimate Services





• Use legitimate Services

1261945#H1kb.ent
HOSTNAME:
OS:Microsoft Windows xp 5.1 Service Pack 2 (Build 2600) Cdrive is FAT Start UP Time:2016-05-10 16:42:33 Port:1601 xk-Il, shutdown-,HBkCnt-0,LBkCnt-0
Process=c:\_AV Tools\OllyDbg110\LOADDLL.EXE.ID=1364, user= Other is: ProtectedS is: szDriverVersion=, kbVersion=, getw=,viask=,www=1,
Waring=BE FOUND ALERT debug=c:\_AV Tools\OllyDbg110\LOADDLL.EXE IsInsideVMWare
http://www.http://wwww.http://www.http://www.http://www.http://www.http://www.http://www.http://www.http://www.http://www.http://www.http://www.http://www.http://www.http://www.http://www.http://www.http://w
Decypt Save Error








xor	eax, eax
push	esi
push	eax ; hTemplateFile
push	2200000h ; dwFlagsAndAttributes
push	3 ; dwCreationDisposition
push	eax ; 1pSecurityAttributes
push	eax ; dwShareMode
mov	al, [esp+18h+arg_4]
neg	al
sbb	eax, eax
mov	esi, ecx
and	eax, 40000000h
or	eax, 80000000h
push	eax ; dwDesiredAccess
push	<pre>[esp+1Ch+1pFileName] ; 1pFileName</pre>
call	ds:CreateFileA
	- 1a



10c_10	024BDD:	
xor	eax, eax	
lea	ecx, [ebp+Bytes]	Returned]
push	eax	; lpOverlapped
push	ecx	; 1pBytesReturned
mov	ecx, [ebp+lpInBu	uffer]
push	eax	; nOutBufferSize
push	eax	; 1pOutBuffer
call	sub 10024CFF	
push	eax	; nInBufferSize
push	[ebp+lpInBuffer]	
push	900A4h	; dwloControlCode
push	dword ptr [esi]	
call	ds DeviceloCont	








push	ebp			
mov	ebp, esp			
sub	esp, 4Ch			
push	0	; hTemplateFile		
push	80h	; dwFlagsAndAttributes		
push	3	; dwCreationDisposition		
push	0	; 1pSecurityAttributes		
push	0	; dwShareMode		
push	80000000h	; dwDesiredAccess		
mov	eax, [ebp+lpFileName]			
push	eax	; lpFileName		
call	ds:CreateFileA			








#### Was it always like this?

Year	Version	Description
2009	3.5.6	Active monitoring of Specific AV and Firewall Processes
2011	4.1.5	First Sentry Stopper routine added Keylogger implemented as a separate module
2012	4.3.3	AV and firewall process monitoring on demand
2013	4.6.5	Second Sentry Stopper routine implemented
	4.7.1	Use of legitimate SMTP service
	4.7.4	64-bit architecture support Updated Steganography decryption routine
2016	4.9.A	Packed with PECompact 2.xx

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#### Lateral Movement?

lea	eax, [ebp+cp]
push	eax
lea	eax, [ebp+FileName]
push	offset aS ; "\\\\%s"
push	eax ; char *
call	_sprintf
push	OFFFFFFFh ; int
lea	eax, [ebp+FileName]
push	offset aRemoteregistry ; "RemoteRegistry"
push	eax ; 1pMachineName
call	Start_target_Service
add	esp, 18h
lea	eax, [ebp+phkResult]
push	eax ; phkResult
lea	eax, [ebp+cp]
push	8000002h ; hKey
push	eax ; 1pMachineName
call	edi ; RegConnectRegistryA
test	eax, eax
jnz	loc_100045D5




#### Lateral Movement?

рор	esi	
push	esi ; int	
push	4 ; dvType	
push	offset a1 ; "1"	
push	offset aStarthinstance ; "StarthInstance"	
push	eax ; 1pSubKey	
push	[ebp+phkResult] ; hKey	
call	Create install reg key	
push	esi ; int	
push	esi ; dwType	
push	offset aWleventstartup ; "WLEventStartup"	
lea	eax, [ebp+Winlogon_notify_knf]	
push	offset aStartup ; "Startup"	
push	eax ; 1pSubKey	
push	[ebp+phkResult] ; hKey	
call	Create_install_reg_key	
push	esi ; int	
push	esi ; dwType	
push	offset aWleventstartsh ; "WLEventStartShell"	
lea	eax, [ebp+Winlogon_notify_knf]	
push	offset aStartshell ; "StartShell"	
push	eax ; 1pSubKey	
push	[ebp+phkResult] ; hKey	
call	Create_install_reg_key	
add	esp, 48h	
lea	eax, [ebp+Winlogon_notify_knf]	
push	esi ; int	
push	esi ; dwType	
push	offset aWleventshutdow ; "WLEventShutdown"	
push	offset aShutdown ; "Shutdown"	
push	eax ; 1pSubKey	
push	[ebp+phkResult] ; hKey	
call	Create_install_reg_key	
push	esi ; int	
push	esi ; dwType	
push	offset aKnfy_dl1 ; "knfy.dl1"	


#### Lateral Movement?


#### **Connected Machine**





#### What are they after?







#### What are they after?











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#### **CnC** Distribution





#### Summary

- Multiple methods of data exfiltration
- AV retaliation as opposed to stealth
- Constant mapping of target environment
- The need for better understanding of attackers



# Thank You.

